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COMMUNIST BLOC  
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CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

C O N T E N T S

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- Disarmament: Propaganda Reflects Soviet Inflexibility . . . . . 1  
Comment Plays Down Importance of Communications Link  
Moscow Says U.S. Position on Tests Scientifically Unsound  
USSR Cautions Against Danger of NATO Nuclear Force
- Germany: Peace Treaty Needed to Block Bonn's Atomic Plans . . . . . 5  
Moscow Silent on Second Rusk-Dobrynin Talk on Berlin  
Western "Misuse" of Air Corridors Protested  
Moscow Protests West Germany's Steel Pipe Embargo

LATIN AMERICA

- Peking Stresses Need for "Struggle" on Bay of Pigs Anniversary . . . . . 8  
Cuban Guest in CPR Recalls Offer of Chinese "Volunteers"

SOUTH ASIA

- Peking Suggests New Geneva Conference on Laos . . . . . 10  
CPR, DRV Urge Cochairmen to Curb U.S. "Intervention"  
Peking Denies Reports of CPR Intervention in Laos  
Propaganda Pictures Neutralist-Pathet Lao Unity
- Article Indicates DRV Party Is "Brain" Behind Insurgents . . . . . 14  
Southerners Cautioned Against Undue Concern Over Defoliants

(continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

E  
A  
S  
T  
  
•  
  
W  
E  
S  
T

A  
F  
F  
A  
I  
R  
S

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

BLOC RELATIONS

Hanoi Theoretical Journal Supports Peking . . . . . 17

THE USSR

PRAVDA "Clarifies" May Day Slogan on Yugoslavia . . . . . 18

Disarray Further Indicated in Tampering With PRAVDA Editorial

Unpublicized Malinovskiy Pamphlet Reflects Party Viewpoints . . . 21

Party Dominance of Military Affairs  
Doctrinal Shifts on "Surprise" and Ground Forces  
Other Topics

COMMUNIST CHINA

RED FLAG Criticizes CPR Writers and Literary Critics . . . . . 25

Writers Fail to Create Orthodox, Yet Readable Literature  
Critics Shirk Their Responsibilities

CONFIDENTIAL

C  
O  
M  
M  
U  
N  
I  
S  
T  
  
I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
N  
A  
L  
  
A  
F  
F  
A  
I  
R  
S

- 1 -

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

### DISARMAMENT: PROPAGANDA REFLECTS SOVIET INFLEXIBILITY

Moscow's low-volume attention to the Geneva conference echoes a now stereotyped propaganda line in contrasting Western "insincerity and obstructionism" with a Soviet posture of reasonableness. Comment plays down the 5 April agreement on the establishment of a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington; despite this agreement, Moscow deplores the fact that "no progress" has been made since the conference reconvened in February. Little attention is given to Tsarapkin's "clarification" (on 27 March) of the "Gromyko plan" to allow onsite inspection of declared missile-launching pads, and current propaganda reflects continued Soviet inflexibility on the test issue. Although wide publicity is given the 8 April Soviet notes to Washington, London, and Bonn scoring Western plans for the "proliferation" of nuclear weapons through a multilateral nuclear force, there have been no calls for negotiations on an agreement to limit the spread of these weapons; rather, propagandists, like Tsarapkin, continue to press for discussion of the Soviet proposals for an agreement prohibiting the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic weapons and for a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty.

### Comment Plays Down Importance of Communications Link

Moscow persists in charging the West with insincerity at Geneva; Tsarapkin on 10 April typifies comment in alleging that a recent speech by Stelle shows that the United States is "in reality far from embarking upon the road to disarmament and regards negotiations in the committee simply as a means for achieving its military and political purposes."\* While Tsarapkin and others do not threaten a Soviet walkout, a 5 April PRAVDA article, carried in the home service, voices concern over the "fate of the talks themselves." The article charges the West with "blatant" obstructionism on the test issue and observes that the prospects for an agreement on the questions under review are "receding further and further."

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\* Moscow's handling of the recess question is also an apparent effort to contrast the respective positions of the United States and the USSR. Thus the account of the 10 April session states that the committee discussed "the U.S. proposal for a long recess" and adds that the Soviet Union, which "is ready to continue work," opposes a long break.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

In line with its contention that the negotiations since February have produced no results, Moscow's propaganda deemphasizes the importance of the agreement to establish a direct Moscow-Washington communications link. Comment prior to 5 April did not anticipate the agreement, and the TASS account of the 29 March plenary session completely ignored the U.S. proposal for such an agreement, noting only that Stelle reiterated "old U.S. proposals concerning such measures as 'prevention of troop movements,' 'exchange of military missions,' and so forth." A TASS account of the 5 April session briefly notes that Tsarapkin stated that the Soviet delegation "is ready to study the proposal," and domestic service newscasts the following day report that the Western press "welcomed" the agreement. While a 6 April Moscow broadcast to North America quotes Tsarapkin to the effect that the establishment of a communications link "could have certain positive results despite all its shortcomings," a TASS-reviewed PRAVDA article the next day contends that "no progress" has been made since February. And NEW TIMES, according to a 10 April TASS review, characterizes the agreement as a "positive achievement," but then cautions that those who think it can change anything "in substance...are only sowing dangerous illusions and wittingly or unwittingly distracting public attention." Tsarapkin's refusal to allow any reference to the agreement in the report submitted to the U.N. General Assembly is not reported by TASS.

Continuing its selective coverage of the Geneva proceedings, Peking's NCNA reports the communications agreement without comment.

#### Moscow Says U.S. Position on Tests Scientifically Unsound

Repetitious comment on the test issue continues to gloss over the Western positions, particularly regarding specific proposals on the modalities of a test accord; it stresses the adequacy of three onsite inspections and three automatic seismic stations to insure treaty compliance and alleges that Western efforts to obtain more "concessions" from the USSR are aimed at securing more favorable conditions for espionage. The 1 April U.S.-U.K. memorandum on the test question is characterized as an attempt to draw the talks into a "quagmire" of technical details as "a means of disguising U.S. renunciation of a nuclear test ban." In a 12 April commentary to domestic listeners Moscow charges that the U.S. delegation has been "exerting pressure" to prevent the neutralists from taking the initiative on the test issue; there is no reference, however, to the nature of this reported initiative.

Consistent with earlier charges that the West's position on the inspection issue is scientifically unsound, an 11 April commentary broadcast 13 times to foreign audiences publicizes a recent letter by noted American scientists which appeared in the Western press. The commentary asserts that while

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

the scientists "dare not overtly refute" Western arguments put forth at Geneva, they have clearly demonstrated that the United States need not fear that a treaty would be clandestinely violated "even without Soviet agreement to the proposal for automatic seismic stations and international inspections." TASS notes on 16 April that Congressman Hosmer, "defying the consensus...of scientists around the world," has declared that detection techniques do not afford a guarantee against secret tests."

#### USSR Cautions Against Danger of NATO Nuclear Force

Moscow's first formal protest against Western plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force, in the form of "identical" 8 April notes addressed to the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, sums up much of Soviet post-Nassau propaganda on NATO's nuclear defense plans and touches off a flurry of comment.\* The note to the United States--as well as follow-up propaganda--reiterates long-standing warnings against the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr and charges that the West is engaged in broadening preparations for a thermonuclear war. (The note further asserts that if "NATO warships, using the mercantile flag as a cover, started poking about the seas, this would be practically tantamount to an undeclared state of war"; this point does not appear in available followup comment.) A Tolpovskiyy commentary of 9 April, broadcast 30 times to foreign audiences, echoes the note in suggesting that the West is seeking to gain time at Geneva in order to confront the socialist states with "the accomplished fact of the extension of nuclear weapons." Like the note, it issues a vague threat of Soviet countermeasures in stating that the USSR will be compelled to draw the "appropriate conclusions" and to "take measures to insure that the security of the Soviet Union, its friends, and allies is maintained at an adequate level."\*\* Consistent with past warnings, both the note and supporting comment caution that bases, whether stationary or mobile, will not be immune from retaliation--but they add that no threat should be seen in this warning.

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\* In the week 8-14 April, Moscow devoted some 270 items, or 9 percent of total weekly comment, to NATO defense issues. Broadcasts of the text and summaries of the note to the United States accounted for some 90 items of this total.

\*\* The 5 February Soviet notes to France and West Germany scoring the Bonn-Paris "axis" had raised the vague threat of countermeasures, cautioning that a nuclear-armed Bundeswehr would "force" the Soviet Union to take "such essential steps as would be prompted by such a situation." See BLOC SURVEY for 21 February 1963, pages 5-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

While routine comment following the 9 April release of the note by TASS supports the note's conclusion that the NATO nuclear force concept will result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Moscow propaganda as late as 8 April had vacillated over the implications of the multilateral concept.\* A commentary broadcast to the domestic audience that day stated that Washington had decided to seek approval at the May NATO Council meeting in Ottawa for its plan for a NATO nuclear force, and thus preserve its "monopoly" of nuclear weapons. (Peking, persistently claiming that the United States in fact seeks to maintain a nuclear weapons monopoly in the Western alliance, has thus far failed to mention the Soviet notes. Reporting Secretary Rusk's speech at the SEATO Council session in Paris, NCNA on 11 April states that he again urged allied acceptance of the "widely opposed" multilateral nuclear force plan and observes that the United States "tries to retain control" over its allies through the plan.)

Despite the widely publicized expressions of alarm and the listing of alternatives "to the atomic armament of the German Federal Republic and to any spreading of nuclear weapons," the notes and subsequent comment fail to explicitly call for negotiations on a nonproliferation agreement. Nor has Moscow's reportage and comment on Geneva suggested an interest in such negotiations. (This partial measure was included in the list submitted by the Soviet Union in September 1961 to the U.N. General Assembly, and Zorin, speaking at the 28 March 1962 session of the Geneva conference, had indicated that it "warranted immediate discussion" along with other partial measures which he introduced.)

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\*For a review of earlier inconsistencies in Moscow's comment on the multilateral force concept, see BLOC SURVEY for 21 March, pages 5-6.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY

18 APRIL 1963

- 5 -

GERMANY: PEACE TREATY NEEDED TO BLOCK BONN'S ATOMIC PLANS

Propaganda on the German problem following the 8 April notes to the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany stresses the line--voiced only occasionally in earlier post-Nassau propaganda--that the "alternative" to a nuclear armed West Germany is a peace treaty and a "free demilitarized" West Berlin. Comment, however, does not suggest that the U.S.-Soviet exploratory talks on Berlin have acquired a new urgency due to Western plans to "give the Bundeswehr access to rocket nuclear weapons." Perfunctory protests on Western, and particularly West German, "misuse" of West Berlin recur in routine comment, but in this context the issue of "liquidating" the occupation regime is largely avoided. The ambiguous Soviet proposal for replacing the "NATO flag" in West Berlin with the U.N. flag continues to be publicized without elaboration.

Moscow Silent on Second Rusk-Dobrynin Talk on Berlin

As in the case of the 8 April Kohler-Gromyko meeting, neither Moscow radio nor the Moscow press mentioned the meeting between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington on 12 April, the second round in the current U.S.-Soviet exploratory talks on Berlin. (The resumption of the bilateral exchange on 26 March had occasioned only a brief TASS report and a single commentary beamed only to Germany.) East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, on the other hand, reported on 14 April that Secretary Rusk received the Soviet ambassador and that a State Department spokesman announced after the meeting that the Rusk-Dobrynin talks "will be continued in the near future."

Prior to 12 April, Soviet comment on the bilateral exchanges included a Polyanov IZVESTIYA article on 7 April which scored Bonn for allegedly attempting to deadlock the U.S.-Soviet talks on Berlin while in the meantime acquiring "the cherished pushbutton of atomic war." Polyanov wrote that it is "strange" that the Bonn "militarists," who are trying to "place a mine under the negotiating table," are not "brought up short" by Washington, which instead is "even condoning Bonn's warlike exercises." (Three days later a Kozyakov broadcast to North America flatly stated that the U.S. Government "refuses to sign a German peace treaty" while at the same time it is getting West Germany "accustomed to nuclear weapons.") Polyanov concluded that the bilateral talks must be "conducted, conducted with honest intentions."

Polyanov--along with other Soviet propagandists--lauded British Labor Party leader Wilson and "a number of other Western politicians" for insisting that the "time has come" for the West to display flexibility with regard

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 6 -

to the German problem and "recognize the GDR and its eastern border, the Oder-Neisse line." And Washington TASS correspondent Derevenskov promptly reported that Senator Pell on 11 April told the Senate that the United States "might recognize the de facto existence of two German governments and accept the Oder-Neisse border." Derevenskov added without comment that Senator Pell insisted that the Western powers keep the right to maintain a garrison in West Berlin and suggested that "European branches of the United Nations be moved to Berlin." The NEUES DEUTSCHLAND report of the Rusk-Dobrynin talk stated that Senator Pell advocated a "revision of the status of the Allied troops" stationed in West Berlin as the "price" of East-West agreements on access to West Berlin.

#### Western "Misuse" of Air Corridors Protested

Charging that the "uncontrolled transportation of explosives" to West Berlin "proves that the GDR must control the communication routes to and from the city," East Berlin's weekly information bulletin AUSSENPOLITISCHE KORRESPONDENZ, as reported by ADN on 3 April, links the use of the air corridors with West Berlin bombing incidents--notably the 5 March bomb explosion at the Intourist office. The bulletin alleged that the investigation of the incident showed that the explosive used in the Intourist incident, which is "only used by the West German Bundeswehr, could only have reached West Berlin by air." In view of such "misuse" of the traffic lines, the publication said, the Western powers must conclude "normal transit arrangements with the GDR government." It reiterated the standard pledge of GDR readiness to guarantee "free and peaceful access to a neutral, free West Berlin."

Available Moscow comment has not mentioned the East German bulletin's argument and has, in fact, deemphasized recent air corridor incidents. For example, TASS on 21 March had claimed that the occupation authorities "once again violated the understanding on using the air corridors only to supply their military garrisons" in West Berlin by making these corridors available "to smuggle weapons for West Berlin military police units"; this has not been mentioned in subsequent propaganda. And the 2 April incident involving Soviet jets buzzing a private British plane in the air corridors to Berlin elicited only a TASS report of the 4 April statement made by the Soviet chief controller in the Allied Air Safety Center in Berlin (released by ADN two hours earlier than by TASS) and a somewhat defensive 6 April domestic service commentary. The Soviet controller's statement vaguely warned that "in case of a repetition of such flights to and from West Berlin, their safety cannot be guaranteed." The commentary, by Trofimenko, displayed sensitivity in rebutting the "tall stories" publicized by British media to the effect that "the Russians were allegedly not observing inter-allied agreements" in respect to the air corridors. Trofimenko claimed that the pilot of the British private plane, Hughie

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY

18 APRIL 1963

- 7 -

Green, "was flying without any timetable arrangements or any agreement on the part of the Soviet section in the Air Safety Center." After alleging that the British authorities "literally provoked Green to a flight for which no permission had been obtained," the commentator stated that the British pilot, after learning the facts, "expressed his profound indignation at the actions of the British Air Ministry."

Other assertions that the West is "keeping up tension" in West Berlin follow stereotyped propaganda lines. TASS on 11 April, following past practice on such events, scored the exercises (16-19 April) of the American garrison in West Berlin as a "demonstration aimed at keeping up tension in the 'frontline city.'" And TASS on 10 April routinely commented that as a "convenient pretext for a major political demonstration with a view to aggravating the situation in West Berlin," Chancellor Adenauer announced in his 10 April TV interview his intention to accompany President Kennedy to West Berlin during the latter's visit to Europe. (To date, Moscow has not editorialized on the President's plans to visit West Berlin. The TASS accounts of the President's 21 March and 3 April press conferences merely reported, without comment, that the President expressed his intention to visit the city.)

#### Moscow Protests West Germany's Steel Pipe Embargo

Following the 22 March Soviet note to the United States protesting "interference" in the embargo of large-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, Moscow widely broadcasts its 6 April note to West Germany protesting that government's 18 March "circumvention of the Bundestag" in order to maintain the embargo. The current note reiterates earlier Moscow propaganda lines on the embargo--that the ban "undermines confidence" in West Germany as a trading partner, that pipes are not strategic material, and that domestic production can meet Soviet needs. The note asserts, however, that the Soviet Government "still insists on a strict implementation" of the West German trade obligations and reserves for itself the "right to take such measures as it might find necessary later on." Earlier Moscow comment had generally avoided any reference to possible Soviet counter-measures to the pipe embargo.

West Germany's 12 April reply to the 6 April Soviet note apparently has been ignored by Moscow media. In its reply, Bonn quoted from the Soviet work MILITARY STRATEGY (edited by Marshal Sokolovskiy, and released in September 1962) on the strategic importance of pipelines in supplying fuel during attack operations: "As a medium for the transport of liquid fuel under today's conditions, pipelines are increasingly important because of their economy and low vulnerability to nuclear weapons explosions.... In case of war, pipelines can play a great role in transporting crude oil and crude oil products to the probable war theaters and to the most important industrial areas." As might be expected, Moscow propaganda on the embargo of large-diameter pipes has emphasized the peaceful uses of the pipelines.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

## LATIN AMERICA

### PEKING STRESSES NEED FOR "STRUGGLE" ON BAY OF PIGS ANNIVERSARY

Voluminous Peking propaganda on the second anniversary of the Playa Giron invasion, heavily laced with claims of CPR-Cuban friendship, hews the routine line that "the Chinese people will always stand firmly behind the heroic Cuban people and do their utmost to support Cuba...and back up other Latin American peoples" in their struggle for independence.

Where Moscow greets the anniversary with general references to friendship and a renewal of warnings that "U.S. circles" are "again calling for an invasion of Cuba," Peking takes advantage of the occasion to again indict the Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis and to revive recently muted polemical arguments. Thus Kuo Mo-jo, in his address to a Peking rally marking the anniversary, says that the Cuban people "were neither afraid of U.S. imperialism" nor "fooled by its so-called promise of 'guaranteeing no invasion.'" Reiterating Mao's "paper tiger" dictum, Kuo declares that the United States is "outwardly strong but inwardly weak, and arrogant before the weak but cowardly before the strong. In dealing with an enemy of this type, a pointed struggle must be carried out against him without making unprincipled concession, much less relying on his goodwill and good sense."

Kuo adds that the "demands of the just-minded and peace-loving nations and peoples throughout the world" during the crisis "forced the U.S. Government to express consent to withdraw armed invasion." He declared that "the victory of the Cuban people...against U.S. imperialism was won not by means of modern weapons, but mainly by their own force with support of people of the world."\*

In polemical tones, Kuo quotes Fidel Castro as stating that the Cuban revolution was not a "peaceful transition, but rather a fighting

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\* Kuo thus again rejects the Soviet portrayal of the nature and authors of the "victory," as expressed in PRAVDA's editorial on the Playa Giron anniversary: "The Soviet Union extended the hand of assistance to the fraternal Cuban people and prevented a terrible calamity threatening mankind." And where Moscow describes the October revolution as the most "powerful stimulus" for the liberation movements in Latin America, Peking ascribes this role to the Cuban revolution, which is "illuminating the national and democratic revolutions of the people of Latin America."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY

18 APRIL 1963

- 9 -

transition" and that it "followed a line of armed struggle" against Batista, "a line proven to be correct by history." He also quotes Castro as castigating unnamed "veteran theoreticians" for saying that a "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism took place in Cuba." The example of the Cuban revolution, Kuo adds, "proves that the destiny of history is determined by the people and the revolutionary struggle of people and not so-called new technology and new weapons."

Cuban Guest in CPR Recalls Offer of Chinese "Volunteers"

A Cuban speaker declared at the rally that the CPR at the time of the Playa Giron invasion offered to send "volunteers" to "fight side by side with the Cuban people." The assertion, made by Jose Matar, president of the Cuban National Committee, was translated into Mandarin by a Peking announcer during an on-the-spot broadcast of the rally, but was omitted in an extensive NCNA summary of the speech. NCNA quotes Matar only as thanking the CPR for "past and present support" and saying that Cuba will never forget "these fraternal gestures of support."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 10 -

## SOUTH ASIA

### PEKING SUGGESTS NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS

Moscow promptly reports Peking's 16 April request that a reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos be considered--the first such call from any bloc source. The request is made in a CPR Government statement reiterating charges that the United States is fomenting the crisis in Laos and is bringing the nation to the brink of all-out civil war. It follows by one day a DRV Government statement which was couched in similar language but urged only that the Geneva conference cochairmen take unspecified "measures" to halt U.S. activities in Laos.

For the second time in two months, Peking has reacted sharply and with apparent sensitivity to reports that Chinese as well as Viet Minh military units are operating in Laos. Hanoi, though more accustomed to such reports of DRV operations, matches Peking in fervent and repeated denial of the charges and with countercharges that the "U.S. imperialists" are the real instigators of the current crisis. Bloc and dissident media are unanimous in picturing the Plaines des Jarres conflict as involving the "patriotic" Pathet Lao and neutralist forces on one side and "reactionary" neutralist "elements" together with U.S.-led rightist forces on the other. Having provided this oversimplified formulation of the conflict, the propaganda has only belatedly acknowledged the fact that the supposedly break-away "reactionaries" are headed by the stanchly neutralist Capt. Kong Le.

### CPR, DRV Urge Cochairmen to Curb U.S. "Intervention"

The CPR Government statement climaxes a bitterly worded propaganda campaign to fix responsibility for the current Laotian situation on Washington, but there had been no discernible foreshadowing of the bid for a new conference. The CPR statement in fact stops short of flatly demanding such a conference at this time, stating that the cochairmen should only "consider" such a move in the event that "U.S. imperialism persists in its line of action and the Laotian situation deteriorates further." The statement echoes a 15 April appeal of the DRV Government

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 11 -

in urging that for the present the cochairmen "conduct consultations speedily so as to take the necessary measures to check the U.S. imperialist intervention and aggression in Laos."

In language similar to that of bloc and Lao dissident propaganda generally, the CPR statement charges that the United States, "through the instrumentalities of Lao reactionaries," has created dissension and conflict in neutralist ranks and has "hired bandits" disguised as neutralists to attack the Pathet Lao areas. It asserts that large numbers of U.S. and SEATO military personnel have already entered the Plaine des Jarres and that Laos is "faced with the danger of its national coalition government being subverted and the armed conflicts... expanding into all-out civil war."

The statement does not indicate the kind of action the proposed conference might take, nor does it hint that the agreement signed in July 1962 should be revised. Its assertion that the "grave situation" in Laos "cannot but arouse the close attention of the Chinese Government" is reinforced in a followup PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial declaring that the "Chinese Government and people will not be indifferent to the frenzied activities of the U.S. imperialists in Laos." PEOPLE'S DAILY adds that "peaceloving countries and people in Asia and the whole world" will not let the United States "meddle" in Laos and "scuttle" the Geneva agreements. It stresses a need for immediate action to curb U.S. moves in Laos, where the situation "has reached a critical stage." Laos, it adds, will either move toward peace and neutrality or

be pushed again by the U.S. imperialists into flames of civil war and the abyss of suffering. It is one or the other. That is how sharply the question is posed before the Laotian people and before all peaceloving countries and people of every country.

Warning that "unfathomable consequences" would arise if the United States were given "free reign" to "trample on the Geneva agreements," the statement urges the Geneva signators to "compel the Kennedy administration" to respect Laotian neutrality and sovereignty and to live up to the Geneva accord.

The DRV Government statement of 15 April had charged the United States with "flagrantly sabotaging" the Geneva agreements and lodged an "energetic protest" against U.S. "intervention." This note--also reported by Moscow--called on the cochairmen to take "urgent and effective measures" to check U.S. actions in Laos. But it did not hint at the desirability of a second conference on Laos, and only urged participants of the 1962 conference to "show high vigilance" in the current situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 12 -

### Peking Denies Reports of CPR Intervention in Laos

Peking reacts sharply and with a show of indignation to reports of Chinese Communist military and subversive activity in Laos. The 17 April editorial on the CPR statement complains that such "slanders" are intended to distort the real picture...[and] to evade world denunciation" of U.S. aggression in Laos. The paper insists that both the CPR and DRV "strictly observe" the Geneva agreements.

Peking's most vigorous denial had followed the 11 April statement by the Laotian ambassador to Thailand that two battalions of Chinese Communist troops had entered northern Laos, occupied a number of towns there, and completed construction of a road to the Thai border. This brought a heated round of protests from Peking propagandists. A widely broadcast PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article on the 14th called the statement an "out-and-out fabrication and distortion" and an "irresponsible vilification." It accused the ambassador of "parroting U.S. imperialist calumnies" aimed at covering up U.S. "crimes" in Laos and added that "as is well known, the United States has become particularly unbridled in its aggression and intervention in Laos and has told no end of malicious lies about the CPR and DRV." Regarding the road-building charge, Commentator reiterated Peking's recent vigorous assertions that the road is being built--in line with an agreement with the Vientiane government--only a short distance inside the Laotian border and is not being extended toward Thailand.\* A Peking home service commentary said that "the Chinese people cannot but feel extreme shock and indignation" over the ambassador's statement; and a denial of the charge by Pathet Lao radio was widely publicized.

Hanoi, in more authoritative form, denied the troop charge in statements issued by the DRV foreign minister on 11 April and by the DRV ambassador to Laos on the 13th; a further denial was included in the 15 April government statement calling for action by the Geneva conference co-chairmen. The denials followed the general line that the United States "spread the slanders of DRV troops in Laos" in order to "undermine the friendly relations between the DRV and Laos." The foreign minister's statement charged that the "flagrant slander" regarding DRV troops in Laos, made at the SEATO Council sessions in Paris, were "aimed at finding a pretext for the United States to deepen interference in South Vietnam and Laos."

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\* Western press reports in February that Peking was using its road project in Laos to cover the movement of troops and supplies into Laos and to gain access to the Thai border met with vehement denial from Peking and Lao dissident radios. This propaganda is reviewed on page 19 of the 21 March BLOC SURVEY.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 13 -

Propaganda Pictures Neutralist-Pathet Lao Unity

Bloc and dissident comment not only obscures the fact that the fighting on the Plaine des Jarres is between the main body of the neutralist army and the Pathet Lao, but goes on to imply that the Pathet Lao and neutralist force proper are standing together in the face of U.S.-led rightist forces and U.S.-instigated "reactionary" segments of the neutralist army. Some comment, principally from Moscow, pictures the "Laotian neutralists" as the primary target of the "Laotian and foreign reactionary forces," and seeks to give the impression that the Pathet Lao units are a kind of secondary target and have become involved in the conflict only due to attacks on them by the "reactionaries." A SOVIET RUSSIA article reviewed by TASS sums up this line succinctly with the assertion that the issue in Laos is not hostility between Laotian groupings but subversive activity by foreign reactionaries.

Moscow has, however, broadcast only a light flow of comment on the crisis and--though joining Peking and Hanoi in charges that U.S. actions in Laos pose a "threat to peace in Southeast Asia"--appears more ready than other bloc sources to note possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. A commentary beamed to Vietnam on the 16th expressed "confidence" that Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong "will succeed in rapidly normalizing the situation and will allow Laos to confidently advance along the neutral, peaceful, and national-coalition-consolidating path." Quoting the International Control Commission, Moscow reported that the 14 April cease fire agreement on the Plaine des Jarres "is being observed"--a report which ran counter both to Western press reports of the fighting and to charges by the dissident Radio of the Laotian Kingdom that Kong Le was violating the agreement.

Under Secretary of State Harriman's 14 April statement that the United States would not send troops to Laos, derided as "hypocrisy" in a 17 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and ignored by Hanoi, was viewed with a degree of guarded optimism by Moscow. In one of its few recent domestic service commentaries on the Laotian situation, Moscow noted that the statement "sounds reassuring," but added that Harriman "sought a loophole" by observing that the United States "is not averse to inviting a request for the dispatch of American forces" to Laos.

In line with their claim that the Plaine des Jarres conflict is not basically one between neutralist and Pathet Lao forces, bloc and dissident Lao propaganda has been slow to acknowledge the fact that the neutralist army leader Kong Le is leading the opposition to the Laotian leftists. In the first open criticism of Kong Le, a dispatch datelined

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 14 -

Plaine des Jarres, transmitted by TASS on 15 April, quotes accusations against him by break-away neutralist Colonel Duane and flatly charges Kong Le with wholesale execution of neutralist soldiers "who came out for safeguarding and consolidating unity of all patriotic forces." It also charges him with obtaining help from the rightist forces of Phoumi Nosavan in order to further repress the "indignation" of his fellow neutralists.

ARTICLE INDICATES DRV PARTY IS "BRAIN" BEHIND INSURGENTS

In what is probably the most candid acknowledgment of DRV leadership of the Viet Cong insurgents yet to appear in Hanoi media, an article in the Workers Party journal HOC TAP seems to picture this party as "the brain" and "deciding factor" behind the southern revolution. Although this is a notable observation in view of the considerable caution with which Hanoi has previously alluded to its ties with the Viet Cong, it also points up a general trend by Hanoi toward more open discussion of its relationship with the rebels.

The unique reference to the party's place in the revolution appeared in the March issue of the theoretical journal in the context of an appeal for better party organization and discipline. The author, Nguyen Khai, declares that many party members "do not understand the conditions of the class struggle under the present circumstances," reminds his readers of the country's "temporary division," and adds that

In South Vietnam, the revolutionary struggle is desperate and violent. Our southern compatriots and cadres are fighting the U.S.-Diemist clique, the international reactionary ringleaders, and their lackeys. The U.S.-Diemists are very cruel and cunning. They are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution.

Because the "U.S.-Diemists" realize this, Nguyen Khai adds, they have "intensified their acts of sabotage in North Vietnam by every subtle and cunning scheme and trick," while, at the same time, "suppressing and terrorizing" the southern revolutionary movement. He goes on to urge party members to exercise greater vigilance to foil enemy saboteurs in the north.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 15 -

## BACKGROUND

In the early stages of the southern revolution, Hanoi media pictured the DRV with great circumspection as merely "the base for national reunification," making no reference to any kind of connection with the uprising. The third congress of the Workers Party in September 1960 went a step beyond this position with a call for the North "to strive to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam." And the congress heard Le Duan call the North the "common revolutionary base for the whole country." Although the propaganda continued to stress as a general principle that the revolution was entirely southern in concept and direction and that the southerners were "fully qualified and capable of performing this glorious task," it also contained occasional references to a closer and more direct relationship between Hanoi and the Viet Cong. In this direction, the Vietnam Fatherland Front in September 1961 went beyond the resolutions of the party congress to assert that the DRV is the "supporting force, an acting source of encouragement, and a sturdy sustaining point for the people of the south." A NHAN DAN article early in 1962 called the southern revolt the "third stage" of the overall Vietnamese revolution, and in May of that year, Hanoi reported a threat by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam to "call on the government and people of the DRV" if U.S. "aggression" should continue.

In January of 1963 Hanoi made its first open departure from its policy of professing no actual contact with the southerners, announcing the opening of a "new stage" in north-south relations in which the Hanoi regime and the NFLSV would work together for the "normalization of relations" between the people of the two zones. More recently, Hanoi reported an exchange of propaganda films by the NFLSV and northern artists as well as the dispatch of bloc medical assistance to the southern insurgents.

Southerners Cautioned Against Undue Concern Over Defoliants

In contrast with the high note of alarm and the graphic accounts of human suffering which mark most of Hanoi's propaganda on the southern defoliation campaign, a broadcast to South Vietnamese listeners on 10 April appears to caution the rebels and their sympathizers not to become unduly concerned over the effects of the spraying. It asserts for the first time in its long and strident campaign against the defoliants that the chemicals have only a brief effect on certain plants, and that steps can be taken to avoid or mitigate the defoliants' allegedly toxic effect on humans. After routinely noting that the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY

18 APRIL 1963

- 16 -

chemicals have had a toxic effect on "thousands of persons" and caused great damage to crops and livestock, the broadcast adds that:

Nevertheless, poisonous chemicals cannot continue to harm forever. Shortly after being stripped of their leaves, many types of plants in the South have pushed forth buds and leaves again. On the other hand, the U.S.-Diemists cannot spray poisonous chemicals throughout the south at one time. While one place is being devastated by poisonous chemicals, vegetation in other areas continues to grow and expand. The U.S.-Diemists cannot destroy all types of vegetation and living creatures because nature's strength in struggling to survive outdoes the U.S.-Diemists' poisonous chemicals.

While still pressing the stock assertion that the chemicals are harmful to persons, the broadcast adds that the "principal point worth mentioning is the survival capacity of southern compatriots." Though the chemicals are a "very dangerous means of war," it says, they can be "eliminated or reduced in effect, like any other homicidal means." The broadcast reports that the southerners are perfecting means for mitigating the "harmful effects" of the chemicals, that some affected persons "have been cured" by "medical cadres of the NFLSV," and that the southerners have the means--it did not say what these are--to protect their animals and crops. But the 10 April broadcast, apparently beamed only to South Vietnam, marked no noticeable diminution in Hanoi's lengthy propaganda campaign against the "barbarous" use of defoliants. On 11 and 16 April, for example, Hanoi announced the dispatch of defoliation protests from the Vietnam People's Army to the International Control Commission, the third and fourth such messages since mid-February. VNA reported on the 15th that "nearly a million" northerners have taken part in recent demonstrations protesting the spraying which, it said, "caused big losses in lives and property." Other current Hanoi reports tell of protests against the spraying from various international and bloc organizations and detail the continuing "atrocities" in South Vietnam. Despite Hanoi's persistence in this propaganda campaign, recent Peking and Moscow propaganda reflects a steadily declining--and now almost minimal--interest in the subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 17 -

## BLOC RELATIONS

HANOI THEORETICAL JOURNAL SUPPORTS PEKING

Support for Peking's brand of communist dogma is offered in the April issue of HOC TAP, the theoretical journal of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP). The journal belatedly prints a 13 March speech--previously publicized only in a brief summary by VNA--by Le Duan, first secretary of the VWP, which illustrated again the DRV party's departure in March from a neutral position in the bloc polemic and cautious adherence to a position generally coinciding with Peking's. PEOPLE'S DAILY on 16 April devotes two full pages to the text of the speech, and NCNA broadcasts excerpts.

According to NCNA, Le Duan prefaced his remarks with a declaration that "the attitude toward the theory of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship is the criterion by which a communist's loyalty to Marxism is measured," and then proceeded to indict Soviet theories in these areas. He rejected Khrushchev's notion of the primacy of "economics" over "politics," declaring that since the proletariat "must overthrow the bourgeois rule and establish the political rule of the proletariat," therefore "the political struggle...is of cardinal and decisive significance." Economic and ideological struggle, he claimed, "must serve the purpose of helping to bring about the victory of the political struggle."

While paying token deference to the Soviet-favored theory of peaceful evolution into socialism ("favorable conditions...exist for the working class to seize state power by various methods"), Le Duan declared that "it would be impossible for the working class to seize power without smashing the apparatus of violence in the hands of the bourgeoisie" and that while communists can seek to make revolution by peaceful means, they "must make active preparations for the seizure of power by violence."

Peking reports that Le Duan attacked Yugoslav revisionism for "exploiting" the "urgent desire" of the "nationalist countries" to realize socialism and for advocating a "Yugoslav road to socialism"--a road of "class compromise, abolishing the dictatorship of the proletariat." Duan claimed that "a thorough exposure of the Yugoslav revisionists is a prerequisite for the smooth progress of the people's revolutionary cause in the nationalist countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

## THE USSR

### PRAVDA "CLARIFIES" MAY DAY SLOGAN ON YUGOSLAVIA

The CPSU's May Day greeting to Yugoslavia, in the slogans as originally released on 8 April, is amended in the 11 April PRAVDA in a "clarification" [utochneniye] that is without precedent in the semiannual issuances of Soviet slogans. The original text had withheld an acknowledgment that Yugoslavia is "building socialism." Such an acknowledgment had not appeared in the slogans since October 1957, but its absence this time seemed the more egregious in the wake of the flat statement in the latest (30 March) CPSU letter to the CCP that "we consider" Yugoslavia "a socialist country." The "clarification"--carried on PRAVDA's first page without reference to the amending authority--in effect reinstates the position taken by Khrushchev on 12 December: "How can we ignore the fact that the peoples of such a country [as Yugoslavia] are building socialism?" This sudden about-face seems the clearest indication to date of discord in the CPSU over Khrushchev's Yugoslav policy and how far to push it in the face of Peking's demand that it be renounced as a condition for Sino-Soviet unity. Contention over the issue had been reflected, more obliquely, in vacillation and divergent emphases in Soviet propaganda over the past six months regarding the degree of danger posed by "revisionism."\*

PRAVDA on 13 April duly reflects the amendment in a new editorial devoted to the May Day slogans, underlining Yugoslavia's reinstatement in the "socialist" family by listing it alphabetically with all the bloc states "building socialism." PRAVDA's original editorial on the slogans, published the day after they were issued, had begged the question, naming neither Yugoslavia nor any of the bloc countries.

### Disarray Further Indicated in Tampering With PRAVDA Editorial

Disarray in the propaganda seems further indicated by the appearance of a number of passages in Radio Moscow's version of the 13 April PRAVDA editorial which are not in the published text. These passages

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\* For a detailed discussion of these divergencies see Radio Propaganda Report RS.56 of 5 April 1963, "Signs of Conflict in the Soviet Leadership Since Cuba," Part IV, pages 12-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 19 -

have the net effect of giving the radio version a distinctly harder, more militant cast than the version published in PRAVDA. Some of the passages are taken directly from various May Day slogans, and others are original. The passages that appear in the radio version but not in PRAVDA are underlined in the excerpts provided below:

Long live Marxism-Leninism, the great revolutionary teaching, the mighty ideological weapon of the working people of the whole world! [slogan No. 5] The unbreakable Marxist-Leninist unity and solidarity of the great army of communists of the whole world is growing stronger! [No. 7] Raise higher the banner of proletarian internationalism! [No. 8]

\* \* \* \* \*

The Soviet Union has been and is supporting the people's sacred wars of liberation. It gives comprehensive moral, economic, political, and military support to the national liberation movement. While coming out against the export of revolution, our party has always done and is doing everything to bar the path to the export of counterrevolution. [not from slogans] Socialist revolutions, national liberation, anti-imperialist, and anti-colonial revolutions... --all these in our time are flowing into a single world-wide stream....

\* \* \* \* \*

... But this [imperialism no longer determines historic development] does not mean that imperialists are not striving to regain their lost positions and preserve domination over the peoples.

There is no guarantee that they will not attempt to unleash a new world war. However, the world war with which imperialism threatens mankind is not fatalistically inevitable.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the fight for peace, a tremendous role is being played by the popular masses. Their task is to struggle even more resolutely for general and total disarmament, against the dominance of monopolies and the violence of militarism, and for the unmasking of the anti-popular, predatory nature of imperialism. [from No. 12] All those who cherish peace must demand the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 20 -

transformation of West Berlin to a free and demilitarized city. [from No. 15]

\* \* \* \*

... In the interests of stable peace throughout the world, strengthen the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union!

The Soviet people warmly greet peoples who are struggling for complete independence, against American military bases, for peace and friendship with neighboring states, and who are defending their democratic rights. [includes part of No. 46 greeting the Japanese] The Soviet people join their voices in the demand of the world public: Freedom to the victims of reaction, the prisoners of capital! [No. 10]

Whatever the explanation for the discrepancies between the broadcast and the published text, the evidence tends to support the surmise that the Radio Moscow version represents the original text of the editorial and that the passages in question were deleted by PRAVDA's editors just prior to publication. Under this explanation, Radio Moscow did not add the passages itself--an action that would be both unprecedented and, on its face, a blatant arrogation of the authority of PRAVDA's editors--but for some reason failed to make the deletions. One item of internal evidence favoring this surmise is that at least one sentence in the PRAVDA text reads awkwardly without the sentence in the broadcast version: "There is no guarantee that they [the imperialists] will not attempt to unleash a new world war." (See the third extract quoted above.) The succeeding "however" seems to call for the deleted sentence. Without it, the PRAVDA text is ambiguous and inept since it follows a sentence similarly introduced by "But" in the previous paragraph.

The evidence supporting the above explanation is neither consistent nor clearcut. Radio Moscow carried its version of the editorial at 0900 Moscow time on 13 April, a number of hours after PRAVDA was on the newstands. At the same time, Radio Moscow appears to have had this longer version in its hands at least as early as 0400 Moscow time on the 13th, since a broadcast summary of the editorial at that hour contained one of the passages in question. The Moscow TASS transmission to the Soviet provincial press, in contrast to Radio Moscow, duly carried the shorter PRAVDA text of the editorial at 0600 that morning. The Moscow radio finally got around to broadcasting the shorter PRAVDA text of the editorial on the evening of the same day in its Albanian-language program.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 21 -

UNPUBLICIZED MALINOVSKIY PAMPHLET REFLECTS PARTY VIEWPOINTS

One of the most puzzling recent documents relating to Soviet military affairs is a pamphlet attributed to Marshal Malinovskiy which appeared late last year, with no announcement of its publication in the press or by the radio. Entitled "Vigilantly They Stand in Defense of Peace" and issued by the Military Publishing House, the pamphlet contains a series of statements on a variety of military and military-political questions which diverge from viewpoints previously stressed in the military press and previously associated with Malinovskiy personally. In terms of the party-military relationship, the pamphlet may be characterized as expressing a strong party viewpoint. In terms of the Khrushchev-military relationship, it may be described as a Khrushchev document. Apart from these aspects, the pamphlet contains statements about Soviet military doctrine which reflect important shifts in emphasis as compared with what has previously been revealed about the contents of the doctrine.

The nature of the pamphlet, and the circumstances of its publication, give grounds for suspecting its ostensible authorship and auspices. One possible explanation might be that it was prepared and published by the Main Political Directorate--against the genuine wishes of Malinovskiy--as a party rebuttal to overly zealous exponents of professional independence in the military leadership. If such an explanation comes close to the truth, it could be further speculated that this pamphlet may have been among the sources of friction giving rise to the political demonstrations on the occasion of the Stalingrad anniversary.

Selected Highpoints of the Pamphlet

The number and variety of questions raised by the pamphlet cannot be dealt with adequately in this brief review. The following comments are intended merely to draw attention to certain points of the pamphlet which bear particularly on the question of party-military relations.

PARTY DOMINANCE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

The main impression conveyed by the pamphlet is that of complete party dominance of military affairs. One striking expression of this bias is the treatment of the origins and authorship of the military doctrine. A concerted effort to ascribe the credit for the doctrine to the military leadership was discernible in the military press last year. In the pamphlet, however, the credit is given directly to the political leadership. "Military doctrine is worked out and defined," states the pamphlet, "by the political leadership of the state."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

Beyond this, the pamphlet inflates the role of Khrushchev personally in the development of the doctrine. In addition to crediting him with laying the bases of the doctrine--a credit which has been given before--the pamphlet implies that the additions and refinements subsequently incorporated in the doctrine also derived from Khrushchev. It refers in this connection to "other speeches" of Khrushchev and to "documents and decisions of the party," but says nothing about the contributions of military thinkers to the process, or about the major contribution (never heretofore omitted in such references) of Malinovskiy's own speech at the 22d party congress.

The pamphlet abounds with generalized praise of the party's role in military affairs and again, in this connection, draws special attention to Khrushchev's personal role. "All questions concerning the defense of the Fatherland," it states, are decided in "exact correspondence with the ideology and policy of the party, on the basis of its resolutions and directives." It goes on, in an extraordinarily obsequious litany, to extoll Khrushchev's services in this regard. "The Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Presidium of the Central Committee, CPSU, headed by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev daily occupy themselves with the questions of the life and activity of the Armed Forces...." "The Central Committee of the CPSU and comrade N.S. Khrushchev personally devote very great attention to the Armed Forces...." "The First Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, personally knows many leading designers of armaments and military technology, scientists and experimenters, helps them with his counsel, encourages them to new successes."

#### DOCTRINAL SHIFTS ON "SURPRISE" AND GROUND FORCES

The pamphlet places much greater emphasis on the feasibility and likelihood of surprise attack in a future war than has previously been evident in public discussions of the doctrine. In line with this emphasis, it goes further than any previous public statement in implying that Soviet strategy envisions the employment of preemptive action at the beginning of a war. Also in line with this emphasis, it gives relatively little weight to the doctrinal principle--which it acknowledges--that large ground forces will be required in a future war.

Regarding the surprise factor, the pamphlet states explicitly, and without qualification, that if a war is launched on the Soviet Union it is "very probable" that it would begin by surprise attack. This assertion comes immediately following a statement that an aggressor would derive great advantages from surprise attack. The text reads: "Such a beginning [surprise attack] is the most favorable for an aggressor, which means that it is also very probable."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY  
18 APRIL 1963

- 23 -

Regarding the employment of preemptive action, the pamphlet contains two highly unusual formulations. The formulations imply that the threshold for triggering Soviet preemptive action would be lowered to a point rendering virtually meaningless any attempt to distinguish such action from preventive war. The first formulation comes in connection with an assertion that the Soviet Union depends on both deterrence and the capability to counteract. The pamphlet states: "The best means of defense is the forewarning of an adversary concerning our strength and the capability to destroy him at the first attempt to complete an act of aggression [pri pervoy zhe popytke sovershit' akt agressii.]" The second formulation is as follows:

Since a future war may from the very beginning acquire the character of a particularly dynamic and swift struggle, it is in our interests to be prepared for the most decisive, large-scale, lightning-like, and unexpected-for-the-adversary action, with all forces and means in order to insure the irreparable destruction of the aggressor regardless of the means [chosen by him] to unleash and prosecute the war.

Regarding the role of ground forces in a future war, the pamphlet registers a sharp downgrading in the importance of this factor as compared with previous military statements. It does pay formal deference to the doctrinal principle that large ground forces will be required in a future war, but it does so almost grudgingly, and seemingly as an afterthought. Instead of introducing the relevant propositions with the customary manifesto-like assertiveness ("We come to the conclusion that ..."), it observes, half-apologetically, that "our military doctrine ... does not deny an important significance to...." In the context of the pamphlet as a whole, the conclusion seems inescapable that the ground forces were being given a deliberate snub.

This impression is strengthened by the curiously defensive argument that is advanced in connection with a discussion of the territorial-militia system advanced by Khrushchev in his Supreme Soviet speech of January, 1960. In attempting to explain the reasons for Khrushchev's proposal, the author seems likely to have exacerbated rather than assuaged the bitterness which it is known to have created among the professional military. The pamphlet points out that there had been "certain hopes" at the time the proposal was made that the international situation might be improved. Khrushchev's proposal, it argues, was justified by these hopes. While acknowledging that the subsequent changes in the international situation had foreclosed the possibility of reviving the system, it nevertheless maintains that features of the system are fully relevant to modern conditions and are, in fact, embodied in the current Soviet cadre system. "In a word," states the pamphlet, "there is no sharp boundary between the cadre army and the territorial-militia system."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

#### OTHER TOPICS

The subject of ideological education in the army is given heavy emphasis in the pamphlet. As might be expected from the character of the comment described above, the subject is treated from the viewpoint of the party doctrinaire. In every conceivable variation of rhetoric, the pamphlet drives home the lesson that "education in communist consciousness, in Marxist-Leninist 'ideynost'" has acquired increased importance in contemporary conditions. It does not neglect to emphasize in this connection that the "education of the leaders, of the educators themselves" is the main link in this process and the guarantee of its success.

Both in this section and elsewhere, the pamphlet contains a number of allusions to phenomena which appear to reflect tensions and discontent in the army. For example, it describes as "intolerable" any emergence in our midst of a tendency to minimize ideological work or to regard it as opposed to "organizational" work. It goes on to declare: "To those who intentionally or unintentionally permit this flaw in their practice, it is necessary to say: Cease! You are marching in step with all that is interfering with the fulfillment of the important tasks imposed by the party upon the armed forces." Again, in emphasizing the point that commanders must be models of disciplined behavior, it quotes Frunze: "Any indisciplined act by one or another commander or political worker should meet the most severe reproof, and should in any case not pass unpunished." In still another place, it states:

Certain of our military leaders sometimes attempt to justify shortcomings in combat training by the fact that along with the newest equipment and weapons there still exists in the army a significant quantity of models which have become somewhat obsolescent and have been removed from production.

- o -

A number of the propositions contained in this pamphlet have been quoted, or otherwise registered, in a variety of articles which have appeared in the Soviet military press over the past two or three months. A number of the articles analyzed in the last (4 April) issue of this SURVEY appear to have reflected the influence of the pamphlet. One analytical judgment made in that issue of the SURVEY must also be corrected in the light of the pamphlet. This was the judgment that Malinovskiy's reference, in his Armed Forces day statement, to a 10-year term as the period in which the modern development of the Soviet Armed forces had taken place implied a derogation of Khrushchev's supposedly unique services in this regard. The pamphlet now makes clear that the 10-year term reflects a new periodization of the development of Soviet military doctrine which distinguishes the present (third) stage as having begun with Stalin's death.

- 25 -

## COMMUNIST CHINA

### RED FLAG CRITICIZES CPR WRITERS AND LITERARY CRITICS

Two RED FLAG articles in March reveal serious shortcomings on the part of both writers and literary critics in the continuing effort to create a readable, yet orthodox socialist literature for the indoctrination of the Chinese masses. These articles, outlining the correct methods which writers and critics should employ, criticize writers on the one hand for failure to infuse new vigor into the cliché-ridden form of "socialist realism" in Communist China and critics on the other hand for failure to provide "correct" literary guidance. Specifically, author Ching Yuan decries the inability of writers to comprehend the relationship of ideological content to the broad range of topics now supposedly permitted, while Feng Chien-nan belabors critics for their abandonment of constructive criticism in favor of facile approval, or arbitrary rejection, of the writers' works. The two RED FLAG articles appear against a background of increasing preoccupation with literary problems in the CPR, suggesting that awareness of the relatively greater degree of literary freedom sanctioned in the rest of the bloc could be producing a demoralizing effect on Chinese writers.

### Writers Fail To Create Orthodox, Yet Readable Literature

For the past two or three years the party has advanced the literary slogan of "diversity of subject matter" in order to erect a facade of greater literary freedom which would spur regime writers on to better efforts. But Ching Yuan, in surveying the present output, concludes that socialist literature today falls far short of reflecting the "glorious, realistic life" of socialist society. In complaining further that writers have yet to achieve the "diversity" in literature which the party seeks, Ching in effect concedes that the lure of greater latitude for creativity has been less than successful in drawing out the writers.

Writers, Ching maintains, have not fully understood the relationship between the greater latitude in topics now permitted--for example, portrayal of commonplace family life as well as socialist labor heroes--and the continuing demand for ideological content. At one extreme, states Ching, is the erroneous view which holds that subject matter is equivalent to ideological content; that is, if the subject is a "heroic" team leader, the work will necessarily be acceptable, regardless of the writer's literary skill or world outlook. At the other extreme is the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 26 -

equally erroneous view that it is not necessary to imbue commonplace topics with an ideological significance, such as, for example, depiction of the new relationships which exist between members of the family in socialist society. Writers are admonished to pursue an approach somewhere between the two extremes.

In reiterating this by now standard call for a greater variety of topics in socialist literature, Ching Yuan apparently still feels compelled to warn the writers against forsaking revolutionary heroism and great deeds in socialist construction for the so-called prosaic subjects of everyday life. Revolutionary topics, he adds, significantly reflect the times, and there is no basis for the narrow viewpoint which holds that diversity of subject matter conflicts with continued attention to significant socialist themes. Here Ching gives expression to an awareness of the risk entailed in the policy of greater latitude for the writers. He indicates, in fact, the party's concern lest writers "take the advocacy of a diversity of subject matter to mean a relaxation of the demand for ideological content in literary works."

Cautioning that there must not be a diversity of subject matter for its own sake, Ching calls for efforts to guard against various unhealthy signs in literature. "Naturalistic description"--the bugbear of socialist realism--is particularly to be feared: RED FLAG warns that attention to "trivia" such as family quarrels and children's squabbles, or the simple concentration on petty details, will "frequently make life appear drab-colored" and "distort the true picture of life." Any writer who engages in such an approach commits grave errors, Ching adds. Other unhealthy literary signs are those "commonplace, negative, sentimental, or petty" ideological feelings or sentiments which originate among the petty bourgeoisie and among those persons "whose revolutionary determination has deteriorated."

Taken as a whole, Ching's article reflects the dilemma faced by the regime. It has held out the promise of relaxation of criteria for subject matter in an apparent effort to invigorate the literary community. At the same time, it can only loosen the straitjacket around its writers so much without endangering the controls necessary to keep literary output within the confines of socialist realism. Accordingly, it has built so many proscriptions into the "diversity of subject matter" formula as to simply replace one set of restrictions with another.

Ching's article sets out simultaneously to reassure writers that "diversity" does not imply such restrictions and to reconcile the concept of diversity with that of socialist realism. Thus he insists that the smaller, less earth-shaking things in life can indeed be treated in literary works. The question is simply how they are treated. The writer should look for the deeper, socialist implication in the everyday event,

- 27 -

for "if one is a true revolutionary writer, one will not be satisfied with depicting trivial matters." The writer who possesses the correct "world outlook" will naturally write acceptably on a variety of topics, large or small.

#### Critics Shirk Their Responsibilities

In the second RED FLAG article, Feng Chien-nan decries the failure of numerous literary critics to fulfill their roles. Generally, Feng declares, the goals of criticism are to encourage writers to proceed in the proper direction and to help the readers understand what has been written. Both functions, it is strongly suggested, have been neglected.

Specifically, Feng accuses critics of abandoning constructive criticism in favor of either excessive, ill-considered praise, which may tend to encourage error, or harsh and arbitrary judgments which may affect the "creative activism" of the writers. On the first count, Feng feels it necessary to note that not all praise is useful; for, after all, some critics may thus sanction and applaud poor works, as in the case of approval for an artistically or ideologically imperfect character depiction--a "socialist hero" with flaws. This harms both the writer and his readers. On the second count, Feng asserts his opposition to a tendency to render crude judgments on literary works, but simultaneously warns writers that this does not mean that criticism will be discarded. In addition, he calls on critics for concrete criticism--a concentration on the reasons for defects and strongpoints, for example, rather than generalized comments.

Another current problem in literary criticism is the relationship between critics and writers. In the statement that "it is normal and necessary to have criticism and counter-criticism" about various works of literature, Feng's article suggests that the function of constructive exchange is not at all understood. Writers and artists with "positive attitudes" should accept strict, correct criticism, but if a writer does reject constructive advice, the fault does not lie with the critic. Moreover, Feng adds, critics should concern themselves with the ideological viewpoint of a writer, and attack it if necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL